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INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's decision to review the Mojave Basin adjudication brings with it hope that the court will deliver some
much needed clarity to, and guidance on, certain aspects of California
water law. The appellate court decision in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency' applied principles of strict priority based predominantly on
traditional notions of the relationship among different types of water
rights. As this article will demonstrate, the California Supreme Court
has virtually never used a rigid scheme of prioritization when resolving
water rights disputes. Indeed, with the wide range of options available

Mr. Garner and Mr. Anderson practice at the Southern California law firm Best
Best & Krieger. BBK specializes in water, environmental, natural resources, and endangered species law. The firm represents numerous public agencies, including the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the California State Water Contractors, and other local water agencies, as well as private clients. One of BBK's senior
partners is currently serving as a special master for the United States Supreme Court in
a water rights dispute between two states. Firm water law attorneys have also authored
the definitive book on California water issues, California Water, written numerous articles on Western water law issues, and conducted trials and pursued appeals before all
levels of California state and federal courts.
1. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th
737 (1998), petitionfor review granted, 961 P.2d 398, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. 1998).
For the convenience of California practitioners, the editors have included parallel citations for California cases cited in this article.
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to resolve the Mojave problem, the only surprise might be if the supreme court chooses to apply principles of strict priority.
Section I of this article provides an overview of California groundwater law. Section II discusses the background and setting of the Mojave case and the appellate court's opinion. Section III discusses the
development of several water law doctrines that have played a role in
previous California Supreme Court decisions and that will probably influence the high court's decision in this case. Section IV lays out some
of the issues now facing the California Supreme Court, including the
role of equitable apportionment and physical solutions in groundwater
adjudications, the scope of the reasonable use doctrine, the concept of
certainty, and the modern relevance of traditional notions of vested
water rights.
I.

CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW

A. Common Law
California and Texas are the only western states without some form
California groundwater is
of statewide groundwater regulation.
chiefly governed by common law doctrines and the State Constitution.
Although the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB" or
"State Board") has broad authority to control surface water appropriations, the State Board does not regulate percolating groundwater.3
Consequently, groundwater disputes have frequently been resolved in
court.
California law recognizes three types of groundwater: defined underground streams, the underflow of surface streams, and percolating
waters. 4 The law of surface water rights governs diversions from defined underground streams and from the underflow of surface
streams. 5 All underground waters not fitting into these two categories,
including waters in underground basins and waters that have escaped
from streams, are considered percolating waters. There is a presumption that groundwater is percolating.7
2. See generally Eric Behrens & Mathew G. Dore, Rights of Landowners to Percolating
Groundwaterin Texas, 32 S.TEX. L. REv. 185, 192 (1991); Karen H. Norris, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water Law: A Political v. Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY's L.J.
493, 507-09 (1990); David Todd, Common Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case
Study on Texas Groundwater Law, 32 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 233, 249, 257-59 (1992); TEX.
WATER CODEANN. § 52.002 (West Supp. 1994).
3. See CAL. WATER CODE § 175 (West 1997). See generally id., §§ 1250-1845 (outlining SWRCB's duties regarding surface water appropriation).
4. Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v. Baldwin, 100 P. 874, 875, 155 Cal. 280, 284 (1909);
CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1997).

5. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 561, 563-64, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 556,
560-62 (1938); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 495-96, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 375-76
(1935); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 597-98, 124 Cal. 597, 630, 632
(1899); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1201 (West 1997).
6. Vineland Irr. Dist. v. Azusa Irr. Co., 58 P. 1057, 1059, 126 Cal. 486, 494 (1899);
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 2500 (West 1997).

7.

Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924-
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The doctrines of correlative rights and reasonable use restrict the
use of percolating groundwater. In Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California
Supreme Court rejected the English doctrine of absolute ownership
for the more equitable correlative approach. The doctrine of correlative rights affords all overlying landowners equal rights to available water.9 Each overlying owner is entitled to take all water that it can beneficially use on its overlying land, so long as there is sufficient water in
the basin to meet all needs.'0 Because overlying owners hold mutual
and reciprocal rights, in times of groundwater scarcity each user is limited to a proportionate, ecuitable share of the total amount available
based on reasonable need.
Groundwater reasonably and beneficially utilized on property overlying the groundwater basin from which it is pumped is traditionally
use.
considered paramount to an appropriative non-overlying
Groundwater exported from an overlying area for out of basin use is
considered an appropriation because it does not return to the basin
for further use.' Only surplus groundwater is available for appropriation.
The California Supreme Court's landmark 1949 decision in City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra added a new principle to the correlative
rights doctrine. 4 There, most of the substantial pumpers in the Raymond Basin, both overlying and appropriative, were joined in a lawsuit
to determine rights to a groundwater basin that had been declining for
twenty-two of the previous twenty-four years. 5 Plaintiff City of Pasathat pumping should be limited to the safe yield of the
dena claimed
6
basin.

The Pasadenacourt agreed to limit pumping to the safe yield of the
basin and articulated the doctrine of "mutual prescription" to determine which pumpers should curtail their total extractions to ensure
the basin's long-term health. 7 The court held that all parties who had
appropriated water from the basin after the overdraft began, and before the complaint was filed, acquired prescriptive rights against all
25, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975).
8. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 141 Cal. 116 (1903).

9. Id. at 771, 141 Cal. at 133.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.

Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 66 P.2d 443, 444, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 525

(1937).
13. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918,

924, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000 n.6, 1001 (1975).
14. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 33 Cal. 2d 908 (1949).
15. Id. at 22-23, 26, 33 Cal. 2d at 916, 922.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 27, 29-30, 33 Cal. 2d at 924, 926-28.
18. A prescriptive water right is a permanent right to use water acquired when the
essential elements for adverse use are present for the required period of time described by the applicable statute of limitations. 1 HAROLD E. ROGERS & ALAN H.
NicHoLs, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA - PLANNING LAw & PRAcrIcE FINANCE, §§ 228-229, at
328-35 (1967).
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other overlying owners and prior appropriators. 9 The court essentially
rejected the notion that water should always be allocated strictly on the
basis of priority and "in time" appropriation. The court modified the
strict application of the priority of overlying rights over appropriative
rights that it had articulated twelve years earlier in Corona Foothill
Lemon Co.2 According to the court, strict application of the rule of
priority would result in an unequal sharing of the burden of curtailing
overdraft, because pumping by later appropriators would be eliminated while no restrictions would be placed on pumping by earlier appropriators." The parties entered into a stipulated judgment which
based their water rights on the amount of water continuously used
over the five-year period preceding the commencement of the litigation. 23 Ultimately, the court limited Raymond Basin groundwater extractions to the amount of the safe yield, with a proportionate reduction in all parties' usage. 24
The Pasadena court's action effectively halted the decline of
groundwater levels in the basin. Increased return flows resulting from
the growing use of imported Colorado River water raised the safe yield
of the basin enough to allow the court to increase the parties' "decreed
pumping rights" in 1955.3

Despite its successful application in the Raymond Basin, the California Supreme Court subsequently noted that the concept of mutual
prescription actually encourages unnecessary groundwater pumping
and creates "a race to the pumphouse" mentality, since in order to es-

tablish a right overlying well owners and landowners must extract
groundwater. Consequently, mutual prescription encourages an individual to pump as much water as possible.
Several other Southern California groundwater basin adjudications
followed in the 20wake of the Raymond
Basin decision. Adjudications
of
.29
30
the West Basin, Central Basin and Main San Gabriel Basin were all
resolved with physical solutions. In each case, the court continues to
supervise a permanent watermaster who has authority to fund and operate programs to control groundwater extractions and to prevent
.

19. City of Pasadena,207 P.2d at 28-30, 33 Cal. 2d at 926-28.
20. Id. at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
21. Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 66 P.2d 443, 8 Cal. 2d 522 (1937).
22. City of Pasadena,207 P.2d at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
23. Id. at 33, 33 Cal. 2d at 933.
24. Id. at 26, 33 Cal. 2d at 922.
25. James H. Krieger & Harvey 0. Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL.
L. REv. 56, 60-62 (1962).
26. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 267 (1975).
27. ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA - GovERNOR'S
COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS 19-22 (1977).
28. See WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 97-126 (1992).

29. Id. at 127-58.
30. Id. at 159-88.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

overdrafts by replenishment with imported water.3 ' The expense and
time involved in adjudicating groundwater basins, as well as the uncertainty of results, has meant in practical terms that only twelve California groundwater basins have been fully adjudicated.
In its next major groundwater decision, City of Los Angeles v. City of
3 the California Supreme Court significantly curtailed the
San Fernando,"
mutual prescription doctrine. In 1955, the City of Los Angeles
brought suit against the cities of San Fernando, Glendale, Burbank,
and other groundwater pumpers to declare that Los Angeles had a
prior and superior right to all groundwater in the upper Los Angeles
River area." Los Angeles also sought to enjoin the cities• • and
other
35
pumpers from extracting groundwater without its permission.
In a long decision that reviewed and commented on numerous
types of water rights, the court declined to follow the theory of mutual
prescription. Instead, the court concluded that California Civil Code
section 1007 prevents the prescription of groundwater rights owned by
a public agency or a public utility, 6 and that prescription against persons other than a public entity' cannot occur without actual notice of
who is prescripting the water. Thus, the court held that in a groundwater basin with multiple pumpers, continuous pumping by an overlying user or an appropriator does not create a paramount right to the
full quantity of water extracted, nor does continuous pumping cause
other pumpers in the basin to lose their rihts.3 In San Fernando,the
court held that Civil Code section 10073 precludes prescription of
groundwater rights owned by public utilities and public agencies, 0 but
also implied that prescription may be limited by overlying owners' con-

31. Schneider, supra note 27, at 22-25.
32. The adjudicated basins are as follows:
Northern California: Siskivou County - Scott River Stream System, Scott River Valley
(as part of a general adjudication pursuant to CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2503 (West
1997)).
Southern California: Kern County: Tehechapi Basin. Kern and San Bernardino
Couie : Cummings Basin. Los Angeles County: Central Basin, West Basin, Upper
Los Angeles River area, Raymond Basin, Main San Gabriel Basin. San Bernardino
_C.on: Warren Valley Basin, Cucamonga Basin, San Bernardino Basin area (partially

in Riverside County). Riverside County: Chino Basin.

33. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 206-07 (1975).
34. Id. at 1258-59, 14 Cal. 3d at 207.
35. Id. at 1259, 14 Cal. 3d at 207.
36. Id. at 1305, 1307, 14 Cal. 3d at 274, 277.
37. Id. at 1311, 14 Cal. 3d at 282.
38. Id. at 1311-14, 14 Cal. 3d at 283-86.
39. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1301, 14 Cal. 3d at 270 (1975) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§1007 (West 1997)). California Civil Code section 1007 provides in pertinent part:
"[N]o possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of
any land, water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a
public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner thereof." CAL.
CIV. CODE §1007 (West 1997).
40. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1304-05, 14 Cal. 3d at 274.
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tinued exercise of their rights by pumping water." The self-help doctrine was later clarified to mean: "[O]verlying users retain priority but
lose amounts not pumped.
To resolve the problem in the upper Los Angeles River basin, the
court imposed a proportionate reduction in the quantities of water
available to each party to bring the total annual extractions from the
basin within the safe sustainable yield 3
The primary reason the San Fernandocourt rejected the doctrine of
mutual prescription was that its facts dramatically differed from City of
Pasadena. In San Fernando, each of the Defendants was pumping
41. Id. at 1319 n.101, 14 Cal. 3d at 293 n.101. "Even though cities cannot Lose (sic)
their water rights by prescription, their Acquisition (sic)of prescriptive ground water
rights is subject to the limitations stemming from the lawful owner's self-help set forth
in City of Pasadena.. " id. (italics added). This "self-help" doctrine, which seems to
afford overlying owners a measure of protection against potential prescriptors, was first
articulated in Pasadena. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 33 Cal. 2d
908 (Cal. 1949). There, appropriators and overlying users alike had been taking nonsurplus groundwater from the basin for over 20 years. This mutual pumping eventually led to an overdraft and a lawsuit to determine relative water rights. Id. at 32, 33
Cal. 2d at 931-32. As the appropriators had continuously and adversely pumped
groundwater for a period well exceeding the statutory five years, and had met all the
other statutory requirements, their extraction would seem to prevail over the overlying
owners. However, the court held that the running of the statutory period was effectively interrupted by the self-help, i.e., the ongoing pumping, of the overlying owners.
Id.
The original [overlying] owners by their own acts, although not by
judicial assistance, thus retained or acquired a right to continue to
take some water in the future. The wrongdoers [municipalities et
al.]
also acquired prescriptive rights to continue to take water, but
their rights were limited to the extent that the original owners retained or acquired rights by their pumping. Id.
42. Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909, 915, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723, 1732 (1994). Blue Skies Country Club owned a golf
course overlying a groundwater basin. Id. at 911, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1727. The Country Club had been extracting water from the basin since 1956. Due to perpetual overdraft, Hi-Desert County Water District filed a complaint against the Country Club and
other overlying water users to determine the parties' water rights. The trial court's
1977judgement in that case allocated 585 acre-feet per year to the golf course. Id. at
912, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1726. However, in May 1991, a final summary report issued in
conjunction with the case indicated that Blue Skies would have to pay a "replenishment assessment of '$1009 per acre foot for each acre-foot of extracted groundwater
beyond the safe yield allocation,' rather than beyond the adjudicated allotment." Id. at
913, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1729. Thereafter, in November 1991, the trial court approved
the final summary report. The defendant then moved for an order to amend the safe
yield declaration and the judgement. Id. at 914, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1730. The defendant Country Club appealed from the judgement.
On appeal the defendants claimed that the trial court's post-judgement order
improperly gave all parties equal priority. The Blue Skies court noted that, under San
Fernando, overlying users in an overdraft basin either retain their original overlying
rights or obtain new rights by prescription, so long as they continue to pump. Stated
another way, overlying owners retain their water rights by using them. Id. at 915, 23
Cal. App. 4th at 1731-32. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the parties' water
rights were all prescriptive and equal in priority and thus constituted an improper redefinition of the parties' rights. Id. at 916, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1732-33.
43. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1315, 14 Cal. 3d at 293. The case also re-established
that parties importing water have a right to the return flow from it. Id. at 1291-97, 14
Cal. 3d at 255-64.
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groundwater before the basin went into overdraft. The court determined that the purpose served by the mutual prescription doctrine in
City of Pasadena, avoiding the complete elimination of later appropriative uses, was not necessary to achieve a safe yield in the Los Angeles
River Basin."
In the quarter century since the San Fernando decision, it has been
theorized that the case's most important and long-lasting impact may
be in one footnote among the one hundred six page opinion. In
footnote 61 , the court quoted extensively from a United States Supreme Court case, Nebraska v. Wyoming," which was decided on the basis of the "equitable apportionment" doctrine. The footnote states that
mechanical application of mutual prescription does not always result
in the most equitable apportionment of water based on each party's
need.4 7 Instead, courts should examine whether mutual prescription
or some other physical solution best satisfies equitable factors such as
those considered in Nebraska, including physical and climatic conditions,48 consumptive use in different areas, and the extent of established
uses.
This language from the San Fernandodecision, as well as the case's
application of Civil Code section 1007, indicate that the supreme court
does not believe strict priority should be applied to determine water
rights in overdrafted groundwater basins in California, especially
where the overdraft is caused in part by public entities extracting
groundwater for public use."
B. State Groundwater Control
Despite the complex nature of the common law of groundwater
regulation, the State Board's jurisdiction over groundwater has been
kept extremely limited, particularly in comparison to its broad powers
to manage surface water. There are very few provisions in the Water
Code that can be utilized to control use of percolating groundwater. °
Water Code section 4999 et seq. requires after-the-fact reporting of all
groundwater pumped in certain counties (Riverside, San Bernardino,
Los Angeles and Ventura Counties), but gives no authority to the State
Board to limit pumping or assess penalties for overdrafting. Other

44.

Id. at 1298-99, 14 Cal. 3d at 266-67.

45. Id. at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
46. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
47. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
48. Id. at 1298, 14 Cal. 3d at 165; Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1001 (1975).
49. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751-52, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74,
90-91 (1985); Tehachapi-Cummings, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 923-25, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1000-02.

50. In 1979, comprehensive legislation that would have adopted the groundwater
management recommendations of the Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law created by Governor Edmond Brown (Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11,

1977)) was introduced, but the measure subsequently died in committee as a result of
opposing ideas regarding groundwater management. Michael P. Mallery, Groundwater:
A Callfor a ComprehensiveManagement Program, 14 PAC. LJ. 1279, 1299 (1983).

Issue 1

MOJA VE RIVER ADJUDICATION

state statutes related to groundwater are also limited."
In contrast, the State Board's authority over surface water is virtually plenary. No surface water may be appropriated without a permit
from the State Board." In its consideration and issuance of a permit,
the State Board is specifically authorized to consider the protection of
beneficial uses, including fish and wildlife resources.53 The California
Supreme Court has upheld the State Board's broad powers, finding
that, except where vested rights will be negatively impacted, all surface
54
water appropriations are subject to the Water Code's provisions.
C. Local Government Management
Local public entities provide some groundwater management in
California. Some water users and local governments prefer that a
groundwater basin management structure be created by legislation to
help assure predictable groundwater extraction regulations and to
permit groundwater exportation. 5
Counties also typically have
groundwater well permit requirements and assign the county health
and environmental protection department jurisdiction over domestic
well supply and quality issues.56
However, effective local controls over groundwater have been rare.
In 1992, in an attempt to encourage more local control of groundwater, the California Legislature adopted Assembly Bill 3030,"7 which
grants local entities the authority to create groundwater management
plans for groundwater basins. 8 A groundwater management plan may
51. E.g., Water Code sections 1005.1 - 1005.4 protect groundwater pumpers from
the loss of rights in periods of non-use when they have alternative supplies available.
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.1-1005.4 (West 1997). Water Code sections 13550 and
13050 prohibit the use of groundwater for certain purposes, such as golf course irrigation, if reclaimed water is readily available and reasonably priced. Id. § 13550. Reclaimed water or recycled water is water that has been treated for waste and is, therefore, suitable for beneficial use. Id. § 13050. However, the State Board must conduct a
hearing and receive testimony before making such a determination, a process that can
take several years. Id. § 13550(a). Water Code section 1242 requires the issuance of a
permit to store water in a groundwater basin. Id. § 1242.
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1225, 1250-1350 (West 1997).
53. Id. §§ 1243-1243.5.
54. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309 (1980).
55. Perhaps the earliest example of significant local control of groundwater via
state statute occurred in Orange County. Orange County began experiencing serious
groundwater overdraft in the 1920's, and in 1935 the Orange County Water District
was formed as a result of special legislation. BLOMQUIST, supra note 28, at 247-49. The
acts granted the District authority to purchase and spread supplemental water with
funding from a pump tax and ad valorem real property tax. Krieger & Banks, supra
note 25, at 62. The program has proved to be very effective in reducing the critical
overdraft in the basin. BLOMQUIST, supra note 28, at 269; Krieger & Banks, supra note
25, at 62.
56. For example, the County of San Bernardino has extensive well construction
and operation requirements. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CODE §§ 33.0630-33.0645.
57. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10750.10 (West 1997).
58. Id. § 10753(a). AB 3030 authorizes local water agencies to adopt a groundwater
management plan subject to a hearing process and majority protest by landowners. Id.
§§ 10753.2-10753.9. Any local water agency whose service area includes a groundwater
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include components to control saline water intrusion, regulate migration of contaminated groundwater, mitigate conditions of overdraft,
and replenish groundwater extracted by water producers. 9 However,
AB 3030 does not authorize local water agencies to make binding determinations of the water rights of any person or entity, nor in most
cases to limit or suspend groundwater extractions.' °
Another type of local groundwater control is exercised through
Water Replenishment Districts-special districts formed to replenish
groundwater supplies within district boundaries.6 ' The purpose of
these districts is to take any actions necessary to: (1) replenish district
groundwater, including buying, selling and exchanging water; (2) protect or prevent interference with groundwater quality or groundwater
rights; or (3) take any action necessary to put groundwater to beneficial use.62 A district may also take action to prevent contaminants from
entering its groundwater supplies, and to remove contaminants from
groundwater.
Counties also control groundwater through ordinances enacted in
response to local problems. For example, Inyo County adopted an ordinance in 1980 to address groundwater exports from the Owens Valley by the City of Los Angeles. The ordinance establishes a comprehensive system of groundwater management, with the goal of
protecting Inyo County's environment and economy by maintaining
groundwater levels at a depth which is capable of supporting natural
resources." Several counties have enacted ordinances to prevent the
export of groundwater from their respective areas. 65
A potential problem with these ordinances is that counties and
other local entities may not have the authority under their police powers to regulate groundwater, particularly groundwater extractions.6
Additionally, local ordinances are subordinate to state laws that regulate groundwater and are considered pre-empted if expressly or implicitly in conflict with general state law. In 1933, however, the California Supreme Court upheld a county ordinance preventing
groundwater extractions for a wasteful, unreasonable or non-beneficial
basin or portion of a groundwater basin that is not otherwise managed or adjudicated
may adopt or implement a groundwater management plan. Id. § 10753(b).
59. Id. § 10753.7.
60. Id. § 10753.8(b)-(c). Groundwater extractions can be limited or suspended

pursuant to a management plan only if the local water agency has determined that
groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water supply
have proved insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater. Id.
61. CAL. WATER CODE § 60000 (West 1997).
62. Id. §§ 60220-60223.
63. Id. §§ 60224-60225.
64. Antonio Rossmann & Michael J. Steel, Forgingthe New Water Law: Public Regulation of "Proprietay"GroundwaterRights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903 (1982).
65. Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank-A Case

Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225, 1261-62 (1988).
66.

See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 17 Cal. 3d 129 (1976) (city's

police power is limited to affecting only those areas within its jurisdiction).
67. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7; see Rossmann, supra note 64, at 936-43.
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purpose.68 The court found the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
county's police power and groundwater regulation was not solely the
responsibility of the state legislature.69
More recently, the third district court of appeal upheld a Tehama
County ordinance requiring a permit to pump groundwater for use on
nonoverlying land. 70 The court held that the ordinance was not preempted by codified water policy indicating the state's paramount interest in and authority over water, by state law limiting export of water
from certain protected areas, or by water code provisions authorizing
local water agencies to adopt and enforce groundwater management
plans.7
II. THE MOJAVE BASIN
A. The Trial Court Decision
The Mojave River system is located in an arid, desert area southwest of Death Valley, California. It is more than 90 miles in length and
encompasses a groundwater basin of approximately 3,600 square
miles. The basin consists of one large watershed with five distinct
subareas.
The water system has surface and subsurface flows as well as substantial associated percolating groundwater. The surface and groundwater constitute an interconnected water supply. Surface flows serve to
replenish the groundwater basin and the groundwater basin sometimes feeds the river. Surface flows disappear into the basin, but geologic constrictions force the water back to the surface in some places."
The region receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually. Recharge
of basin aquifers ordinarily occurs only after major storms.
Basin overdraft" began in the 1950's and greatly increased in the
1980's. Attempts to address the overdraft problem in the 1960's and
early 1970's were unsuccessful. 7 By the early 1990's, overdraft exceeded 90,000 acre-feet annually and may well have been much
68. ExparteMaas, 27 P.2d 373, 219 Cal. 422 (1933).
69. Id. at 424-25. See Alameda County Water Dist. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 112
Cal. Rptr. 846, 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974) (validating a county water district's underground water storage program).
70. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr, 2d 886, 889, 31 Cal. App. 4th 166,
171 (1994).
71. Id. at 891,893-95, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 175, 178-81.
72. Respondents' Brief at 1-6, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).
73. Groundwater overdraft is "the condition of a groundwater basin in which the
amount of water withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount of water that recharges
the basin [i.e., the safe yield] over a period of years during which supply conditions
approximate average." 1 CAUFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER
PLAN UPDATE, BULLETIN 160-93, at 386 (1994).
"Overdraft commences whenever extractions increase, or the withdrawable maximum decreases, or both, to the point
where the surplus ends." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250,
1307, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 277 (1975).
74. Respondents' Brief at 5, Mojave (No. E017881).
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higher. The overdraft grew with population and economic expansion
in desert communities served by the basin. In essence, the local economy was built on overdraft and basin groundwater reserves. By 1990,
rapid urban growth was causing a shift in water use away from agricultural to municipal uses. By that time, more than 230,000 acre-feet was
annually utilized as follows: approximately 60% agriculture, 31% municipal, and 9% fish hatchery, aquaculture, and lake use.
In May 1990, the City of Barstow and the Southern California Water Company ("SCWC") filed a complaint claiming that groundwater
extraction by the City of Adelanto, the Mojave Water Agency ("MWA")
and other "upstream" producers on the Mojave River system (collectively "municipal purveyors" or "stipulating parties") adversely impacted Barstow's groundwater supply." Plaintiffs requested that the
municipal purveyors be ordered to provide an average annual flow of
30,000 acre-feet in the Mojave River Channel near Barstow." Plaintiffs
also sought to compel MWA to import State Water Project water.77
In July 1991, MWA filed an amended cross-complaint which joined
all water producers within the Mojave River watershed, except for certain small producers.7" MWA sought a judicial declaration that water
supply available in the basin was insufficient to meet demand and also
requested a declaration of the water rights of in-basin water producers. Originally, more than 3,000 parties were named. s° Eventually,
parties pumping less than 10 acre-feet of water annually were dismissed from the action 8 and approximately 450 parties remained.
In October 1991, the trial court ordered a litigation standstill so
that the parties 812
could try to negotiate a "physical solution" to the overdraft problem.
By September 1993, a large majority of basin water
producers remaining in the action had agreed to a negotiated physical
solution to the overdraft problem. More than 95% of the producers
named in the action either stipulated to the proposed physical solution judgment or did not oppose it. Measured from a water production standpoint, parties aggregating 89% of the basin's water production agreed to the solution, while parties representing 93% of the
municipal use and 85% of the agricultural use supported or did not
oppose the stipulated judgment.
The decreed purpose of the physical solution was to: (1) develop
75. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th
737 (1998). MWA and other named water purveyors supply water to communities in
the area including Hemet, Victorville, and Apple Valley.
76. Respondents' Brief at 6-7, Mojave (No. E017881).
77. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 744.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, Riverside County Superior Court Case No.

208568 (Trial CourtJudgmentJan. 10, 1996).
81.
82.
83.

Respondents' Brief at 7, Mojave, (No. E017881).
Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 744-45.
Id. at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745; Respondents' Brief at 7, Mojave (No.

E017881).
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means to conserve local water; (2) guarantee that downstream water
producers would not be adversely affected by production upstream;
and (3) raise money to purchase supplemental water supplies. The
drafters of the physical solution envisioned a system not aimed at balancing water production with natural supply, but rather a "solution
that generates the money necessary to acquire water ... through transfer or through import ....
[I]n the long term the amount of water
supply needed for the area will be made available as opposed to reducing back to some arbitrary amount of water supply."8'4
In anticipation of the physical solution, the parties investigated the
production levels of nearly 6800 basin wells. From that study, a "base
annual right" equivalent to the highest amount of water taken by each
individual producer during the five-year period from 1986-1990 was
determined. Significantly, this base annual production right was calculated without affording priority based on the type of use or water
right.8 5
The stipulating parties agreed to share the burden of groundwater
shortage proportionately by reducing their individual production by
20%. A "ramp down" procedure allowed the parties to decrease their
pumping by 5% annually over the first five years following court approval of the physical solution. Thereafter, unless an adjustment was
made based on local hydrologic circumstances, parties could pump
80% of their base annual right without accruing a replenishment assessment obligation. In other words, the stipulating parties did not allege any water rights priorities in favor of the physical solution. Thus,
there was no reliance on inter se priorities. Producers exceeding their
base annual rights, i.e., their fair share of the subarea free production
allowance, agreed to pay a "replenishment water assessment. '' 16 The
court-appointed watermaster was required to use these assessments to
purchase imported water to replace excess subarea production. The
physical solution did not place restrictions on the quantity of water a
producer could pump. Rather, pumpers exceeding specific pumping
levels were simply assessed fees based on the amount of overproduc18
tion.
The judgment divided the Mojave River Basin into five geologic
subareas, with certain subareas required to provide a specific, historical quantity of water to the adjoining downstream subarea.89 This water supply obligation of the upstream subarea is known as "make-up
water." A make-up water assessment could be imposed if downstream
supply obligations were not satisfied. In other words, the watermaster
would impose such assessments to meet any subarea's deficiency in
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Mojave at 484-85, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90. Id.
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providing water to the adjoining downstream subarea. 9
The physical solution also provided for transferable "free production allowance rights" among the parties, subject to specified consumptive-use limitations. Thus, the parties had the right to transfer
water off their property. For example, an agricultural user could
transfer its free production allowance to an urban user.
At the stipulating parties' request, the trial court approved the
physical solution by way of interlocutory judgment on September 23,
1993, and bound the signatories to follow

it. 92

However, the matter

proceeded to trial to determine the rights of several parties not stipulating to the physical solution. The nonstipulating parties fell primarily into two groups: an association of individual dairy farmers owning
overlying lands in the basin (collectively "Cardozo Group" or "Cardozo
Appellants") and the Jess Ranch Water Company.
After a bench trial, the court determined that inter alia:
1. Imposition of the physical solution on the nonstipulating parties
was necessary to implement the mandate of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution;
2. Continued basin pumping not in conformance with the dictates
of the physical solution would itself constitute an unreasonable use or
method of water use;
3. The physical solution was a fair and equitable basis for satisfaction of all water rights in the Mojave Basin area, was in furtherance of
the mandate of the State Constitution and the water policy of the State
of California, and took into account applicable public trust interests;
4. The physical solution was fair and equitable to the Cardozo
Group and the solution could be imposed upon them because "the
constitutional mandate of reasonable and beneficial use dictates an
equitable apportionment of rights when a water basin is in overdraft."
5. Continuing jurisdiction over the judgment and the parties was
necessary in case any party exercised its right to modify, amend or amplify any practical features of the physical solution based on changed
circumstances or new information.
Following the trial court's judgment, the Cardozo Group and the
Jess Ranch Water Company filed an appeal. 9 The Cardozo Group al91. Id. Separate administrative assessments on each acre-foot of production were
levied to fund watermaster administrative activities and to maintain riparian habitat
and environmental values. Respondents' Brief at 13-14, Mojave (No. E017881).
92. Respondents' Brief at 8, Mojave (No. E017881); see also Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. at
482-83, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 745.
93. City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, Riverside County Superior Court Case No.
208568, at 6, 24-25, 41 (Trial CourtJudgmentJan. 10, 1996).
94. This article does not examine any of the claims on appeal of the Jess Ranch
Water Company. Among other allegations, the Jess Ranch Water Company contended
that the trial court erred by assuming that the proposed physical solution was valid and
by compellingJess Ranch to prove the validity of its water rights. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 749. Jess Ranch also contended that the trial court improperly failed to take into account Jess Ranch's established water rights. Id. Jess
Ranch further argued that the proposed physical solution was inequitable because it
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leged that the trial court disregarded their preexisting, paramount riparian and overlying rights and that the trial court's judgment should
be revised to recognize and protect these outstanding water rights.95
Respondents MWA, Barstow, SCWC, et al., (i.e., the parties stipulating to the physical solution) defended the trial court's action arguing,
among other points, that Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution required the equitable apportionment of water in overdrafted
groundwater basins.
B. The Appellate Court's Decision
Taking the position that water rights priorities are absolute and
cannot be modified or
S96curtailed in any way to accommodate a physical
solution, the Mojave court overturned the trial court's judgment. The
tenor of the court's opinion is captured in its determination that "the
trial court could not overlook well settled principles of water law to establish its own system of groundwater allocation."97
The first part of the court's opinion is devoted to equitable apportionment. That section examines Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, the California Supreme Court's decisions in Pasadena v.
Alhambra and Los Angeles v. San Fernando, and more recent appellate
decisions interpreting and implementing those two cases. The second
portion of the opinion presents the court's analysis of the development
of the law of physical solutions.98
Relying principally upon footnote 61 of the San Fernandoopinion,"
did not treat Jess Ranch the same as other water producers. Id. Specifically, Jess
Ranch contended that the base annual production right that it was awarded was not
calculated on the same basis as the base annual production rights of other producers.
Id.
95. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 746.
96. References to the "Mojave court"in this article mean the appellate court panel.
97. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 749.
98. By granting the stipulating parties' petition for review, the California Supreme
Court has effectively withdrawn the court of appeal's opinion. See Cal. Rules of Court,
Rules 976, 977, 979. Nevertheless, the appellate court's reasoning is relevant because
it frames the issues facing the high court, sets out the legal and policy arguments in
favor of recognizing traditional water rights priorities, and illustrates the practical difficulties associated with resolving disputes involving groundwater.
99. Footnote 61 of the San Fernandoopinion reads:
The principles by which the United States Supreme Court equitably
apportions water among states are illustrated in Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945) 325 U.S. 589, 618 .... After observing that apportionment between states whose laws base water rights on priority of
appropriation should primarily accord with that principle, the court
said: 'But if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible. For example, the economy of a region may have been established on the basis ofjunior appropriations. So far as possible those
established uses should be protected though strict application of the
priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors.
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and
climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sec-
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the stipulating parties argued that San Fernando "has been consistently
interpreted as approval by the California Supreme Court of the use of
equitable apportionment as a basis to allocate water among users in an
overdrafted basin."'00 According to the stipulating parties, the trial
court was required to consider environmental conditions, developed
water uses in the basin, economic reliance on existing water usage, and
other pertinent factors.'0 ' They also alleged that San Fernando cautioned against a mechanical application of mutual prescription because that approach "does not necessarily result
in the most equitable
0 2
apportionment of water according to need.'

The Mojave court flatly rejected the arguments that City of Pasadena
and San Fernando, as well as Article X, Section 2 ' of the California
Constitution, allow for or encourage any modification of priorities in
the context of a physical solution. 0 According to the panel, City of
Pasadenawas not dispositive because in Mojave neither the stipulating
parties nor the trial court relied on the doctrine of mutual prescription.0 5 The Mojave court also concluded that City of Pasadenaand San
Fernando did not support the stipulating parties' arguments regarding
equitable apportionment. 00 The panel further determined that its recent decision in Hi-Desert County Water District v. Blue Skies Country Club,
Inc., 07 as well as Wright v. Goleta Water District'0 " and In re Waters of Long
tions of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent
of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas if a limitation is imposed
on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests
which must be made.'
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d 199,
265 n.61 (1975).
100. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 755-56.
101. Respondents' Brief at 13-14, 19, Mojave (No. E017881). In fact, the stipulating
parties' brief sets out more than ten equitable factors which, they maintain, show the
propriety and equitable nature of the negotiated physical solution imposed by the trial
court.
102. Id. at 21 (citing San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1265, 14 Cal. 3d at 265).
103. As discussed previously, Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution requires that all water rights be limited by the concept of reasonable and beneficial use.
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 383 (1935).
104. Respondents' Brief at 17-18, Mojave (No. E017881).
105. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 752. "The City of Pasadena
case does not support the position that an appropriator can acquire rights without
prescription." Id.
106. Id. at 490-91, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 757.
107. Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723 (1994).
108. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).
The Wright court held that limiting the unexercised rights of overlying users in a
groundwater basin adjudication is improper. Id. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 88. However, it has not yet been finally determined whether unexercised overlying rights can
be prescripted. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318
n.100, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293 n.100 (stating that the prescriptive rights of appropriators
"would not necessarily impair the private defendants' rights to ground water for New
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Valley Creek Stream System,' 9 did not impliedly support application of the
equitable apportionment doctrine. Instead, the Mojave court stated
that flexible application of water rights priorities allowed in the context of surface water adjudications could not be applied in the
groundwater area."' Ultimately, the Mojave panel held that neither the
California Supreme Court nor any appellate court had endorsed "a
pure equitable apportionment which disregards existing rights of overlying owners
and that neither footnote 61 nor Article X, Section 2
permitted the trial court to "disregard existing water rights in order to
fashion an allegedly equitable solution based on prior usage rather
than current beneficial use.""2
To support its conclusions, the panel relied upon legal precedent
stating: (1) that absolute extinguishment of a riparian right would
raise a "serious constitutional issue;"," 3 (2) that proportionate shares of

groundwater pumping for overlying owners should be based upon current, beneficial need for water rather than upon average use over a period of years;" 4 and (3) that overlying owners
may use self-help to pro5
tect their rights by continually pumping.
The Mojave court also expressed its disagreement with the stipulating parties' interpretation of Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board,' 6 ("liD 2') and with the reasoning of liD 2 itself."7
The panel questioned the "unusual addendum" in the ID 2 opinion
which referred to California water rights law as an "evolving process of
governmental redefinition of water rights.""' In fact, the Mojave panel
determined that the addendum actually added to the uncertainty of
California water rights law."9 The opinion challenged the idea that the
1928 constitutional amendment resulted in a legal development that
created a system to marshal the state's water resources to satisfy the
(sic) overlying uses for which the need had not yet come into existence during the
prescriptive period"); see also Hi-Desert County Water Dist., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 23 Cal.
App. 4th 1723 (1994) (holding that trial court improperly rendered all pumpers'
rights equal in priority when golf course had, by exercising its pumping rights prior to

the adjudication, guaranteed a right to pump 535 acre feet free of any assessments in
the physical solution).
109. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339

(1979).
110. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-94, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 759-60.
111. Id. at 492, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 758.
112. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765.
113. Id. at 494, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 761-62 (citing Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 663, 25 Cal.
3d at 761-62).
114. Id. at 494, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 762 (citing Tehachapi-Cummings County Water
Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992 (1975)).
115. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 764 (quoting Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v.

Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 915, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1723, 1732
(1994)).
116. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
117. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 763.

118. Id.
119. Id.
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ever-changing needs of society.
The Mojave panel also rejected the stipulating parties' contention
that trial courts are bound to impose a physical solution if one is available. According to the panel, the doctrine of physical solutions originally contemplated only modifications of engineering and diversion
facility activities to ensure the highest and best use of water."' Acknowledging that the California Supreme Court has sanctioned somewhat broader trial court application of the physical solution principles
to assure the beneficial use of water, the Mojave court nevertheless
concluded that the high court did not contemplate wholesale disregard of the existing water rights of overlying owners or riparians who
refused to participate in a negotiated solution.1 2' Rather, according to
the panel, the "purpose of a physical solution is to avoid a waste of water without
unreasonably or adversely affecting the rights of the par,,22
ties.
III. CALIFORNIA WATER LAW DOCTRINES
A. Development of the Reasonable Use Doctrine
Over the past 70 years, California courts have almost uniformly departed from the application of strict rules of priority where equitable
considerations have suggested modification of traditional propertybased water rights principles. 23 This movement away from strict application of priorities is related to several interrelated legal developments
in California water law, including the adoption of Article X, Section 2
of the California Constitution, the California Supreme Court's recognition of the public trust
doctrine, and evolving principles of Califor24
nia groundwater law.'

120. Id. at 496, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765 (quoting I Rogers & Nichols, supra note 18, §
441, at 579).
121. Id. at 496-99, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 765-70.
122. Id. at 499, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 769 (quoting Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v.
Blue Skies Country Club, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 918, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1763
(1994)).
123. The redefinition of water rights during the mid-1900's has been explained as
follows: "The concept of an immutable, vested right with an absolute priority was replaced with a flexible, context-related right. The limits of the new right were contingent on supply, competing uses of water, and the amount of benefit obtained from exercising the right." ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 95

(1995). See also Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, ChangingJudicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights in Calfornia Water Resources: From Vested Rights to UtilitarianReallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031 (1988).
124. Commentators have challenged the notion that water rights have ever been or
should ever be equated with traditional property rights. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVrL. L. 473 (1989); see also
CAL. WATER CODE § 104 (West 1997) ("It is hereby declared that the people of the
State have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the State and that the
State shall determine what water of the State, surface and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for public protection."). See generallyJoseph L. Sax,
Some Thoughts on the Decline of PrivateProperty, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481 (1983).
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The rejection of absolute water rights priorities by California
courts has sprung in part from the adoption of Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution 25 and increased concomitantly with the judicial application of this constitutional amendment. However, to find
the origin of the doctrine of reasonable use, 1261oo
one must look much
further back in California's water jurisprudence. In the seminal water
case of Lux v. Haggin1 7 the California Supreme Court recognized the
doctrine of reasonable use between riparians. The court held that riparians were entitled to a reasonable use of water, and that what is a
reasonable use is a question of fact, depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. 128
In its opinion in Katz v. Walkinshaw,9 in which the California Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of correlative rights, it also further embraced the reasonable use doctrine. The court noted approvingly:
The doctrine of reasonable use, on the other hand, affords
some measure of protection to property now existing, and
greater justification for the attempt to make new developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water
as may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection
with the land from which it is taken. 30

The constitutional provision requiring reasonable and beneficial
use of all waters.' in the State resulted directly from the California Su-

preme Court's decision in Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison
Co.' In that case, Herminghaus, a riparian rancher, objected to Edison's construction of a reservoir which impeded flows of the San Joaquin River. Herminghaus used the peak flows of the river to inundate
ranch lands and sought to retain the full flow of the river. She claimed
that an appropriator could not cut off her riparian right in any significant measure.
The court agreed, rejecting contentions that the
rancher's use wasted water and contravened the common good.'

125. Case law favoring utilitarian allocation of water over strict prioritization may
also be due, in part, to the recognition that rigid application of water rights priorities
ignores the fact that domestic use of water is the highest use of water in the state. See
CAL. WATER CODE §

106 (West 1997).

126. See generally United Sates v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 171, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 105 (1986) (holding that the reasonable use doctrine

was deemed the "cardinal principle" of California water rights law).
127. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 69 Cal. 255 (1886).
128. Id. at 755, 69 Cal. at 394.
129. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 141 Cal. 116 (1903).
130. Id. at 771, 141 Cal. at 134.

131. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972,
986, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 524 (1935) (holding that Article X, Section 2 of the California Con-

stitution applies to overlying and appropriative use of groundwater).
132. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 200 Cal. 81 (1926).
133. Id. at 615, 200 Cal. at 100-01.
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Subsequent to the passage of the constitutional amendment in
1928, the Court reconsidered and rejected this absolutist position.
Barbara,3 4
Seven years after Herminghaus, in Gin Chow v. City of Santa
the California Supreme Court was faced with a very similar factual
situation. In Gin Chow, Santa Barbara built a dam upstream from
Chow's riparian property.'35 Chow argued that any diminution of his
riparian right was unlawful, and "It is insisted that however small the
invasion of the riparian right may be and however slight the benefit
may be to the riparian owner, still it must be presumed, as a matter of
law, that damage to his lands has resulted entitling him to an injunction.
The court ruled that Chow received minimal benefit from the flow,
that requiring flow to reach his property constituted a waste of water,
and that therefore his use was unreasonable. Thus, the court refused7
to grant the riparian a complete priority over the appropriator.
"[W] hat is an unreasonable use is ajudicial question depending upon
the facts of each case. Likewise, what is a reasonable or unreasonable
use of water is ajudicial question to be determined in the first instance
by the trial court. '' 3' The court also modified riparian rights in cases
brought in the years following Gin Chow.' 9
In Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore IrrigationDistrict,'4"
the court determined that Lindsay-Strathmore's pumping and export
of water out of the Delta, although beneficial, was not necessarily reasonable in light of competing uses and circumstances. In explaining
how Article X, Section 2 had changed water law, the court explicitly
stated that strict priorities would not always prevail and that the needs
of others could be part of the lower court's analysis of the situation at
issue:
Under this new doctrine, it is clear that when a riparian or
overlying owner brings an action against an appropriator, it is
no longer sufficient to find that the plaintiffs in such action
are riparian or overlying owners, and, on the basis of such
finding, issue the injunction. It is now necessary for the trial
court to determine whether such owners, considering all the
needs of those in the particular water field, are putting the
134. Gin Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 217 Cal. 673 (1933).
135. Id. at 6-7, 217 Cal. at 677-78.
136. Id. at 13, 217 Cal. at 694.
137. Id. at 18, 217 Cal. at 706.
138. Id.
139. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (1935) (allowing City
to impound creek flow, and ostensibly awarding downstream riparian only reasonable
amount of water necessary for beneficial uses); see also City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun.
Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 448, 452, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 337, 344 (1936) (modifying riparian
rights to accommodate appropriator and explaining how court's holding would have
been different if case had been decided before adoption of Article X, Section 2).
140. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989,
3 Cal. 2d 489, 531 (1935).
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waters to any reasonable beneficial uses, giving consideration
to all factors involved, including reasonable methods of use
and reasonable methods of diversion. From a consideration
of such uses, the trial court must then determine whether
there is a surplus in the water field subject to appropriation.14
In the 1960's, the court extended the reasonable use doctrine further. In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,1 2 a unanimous supreme
court determined that riparians' use of substantial creek flow to deposit rock, sand and gravel on their land constituted an unreasonable
use of water. In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to enjoin a
water district appropriator which had blocked flow and mineral deposit through construction of a dam. The court further held that
since a
reasonable use of water depends on the circumstances of
each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from state-wide considerations of transcendent importance. Paramount among these we see the ever increasing
need for the conservation of the water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite
apart from its express recognition
4 3
in the 1928 amendment.
Thus, the court effectively precluded exercise of the right for the purpose for which it was being used.
A decade later, the court further clarified the limits on the exercise
of a higher priority riparian right and held that riparians could be
made to endure "some inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses" for the benefit of junior appropriators. 14 In Forni, the State
Board filed an action to restrict certain wine grape growers from directly diverting water from the Napa River during the two-month
spring frost period. The complaint alleged that the growers' diversions
sometimes resulted in a dry river and deprived downstream interests of
flow to utilize for their own frost protection. The appellate court held
that the upstream riparian diversions were unreasonable in both use
and method of use. "As we have repeatedly underscored, the overriding constitutional consideration is to put the water resources of the
state to a reasonable use and make them available for the constantly
increasing needs of all the people."'' 5 Application of strict water rights
priorities would have compelled the court to award the entire flow of
the river to riparians and senior appropriators. Recognizing the unjust
141.

Id. at 986, 3 Cal. 2d at 524-25.

142. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967).

143. Id. at 894, 67 Cal. 2d at 140.
144. People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851,
856, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 751-52 (1976).

145. Id. at 856, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 751.
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allocation of water that would have resulted, the court ordered that a
compromise physical solution be crafted.
Three years after Forni, in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, the court determined that the State Board had explicit power to
limit and reprioritize future riparian rights.146 Long Valley involved a
stream adjudication conducted by the State Board under the auspices
of Water Code Sections 2500 et seq. Ramelli, an owner of riparian land
in the watershed, claimed a prospective riparian right to irrigate more
than 2,800 acres of undeveloped land. He made this claim despite the
fact that for the previous 60 years he and his predecessors had irrigated only 89 acres.
The court upheld the State Board's determination that Ramelli's
unexercised riparian rights should be given a priority lower than the
presently exercised appropriative rights of others in the watershed.' 7
While the court ruled that Ramelli's riparian claim to the future use of
waters could not be entirely extinguished, it held that the State Board
"may make determinations as to the scope, nature and priority of the
right that it deems reasonably necessary to the promotion of the state's
interest in fostering the most reasonable and beneficial use of its
scarce water resources."148 This holding modifies, at least in the context of a State Board stream adjudication, earlier case law holding that
a dormant riparian right was paramount to an active appropriative
right. 49 More importantly, the decision implicitly recognizes that adjudications are not conducive to inflexible applications of water rights
priorities.
As stated by the Long Valley court:
It is well established that what is a reasonable use of water varies with the facts and circumstances of the particular case (citations omitted). And it appears self-evident that the reasonableness of a riparian use cannot be determined without

considering the effect of such use of all the needs of those in
the stream system (citation omitted), nor can it be made "in

vacuo isolated from the statewide considerations of transcendent importance." "

The high court also seemingly suggested that "vested" water rights
could be completely extinguished if such action constituted 5the sole
method to ensure the reasonable and beneficial use of waters. '
The authority of courts to modify water rights priorities was further
146. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339
(1979).
147. Id. at 668-69, 25 Cal. 3d at 358-59.
148. Id, at 669, 25 Cal. 3d at 359.
149. E.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (Cal. 1935).
150. Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665, 25 Cal. 3d at 354 (citingJoslin v. Main Mun. Water
Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967)).
151. Id. at 667, 25 Cal. 3d at 357.
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solidified in cases subsequent to Long Valley. In Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board, 2 ("lID 2'), a California appel-

late court held that the State Board could stop an
from wasting water since the district only had vested
sonable use of water. 15 In a statement challenged by
the lID 2 court explained that water use entitlements
evolved 5 4 "beyond traditional concepts of vested

irrigation district
rights to the reathe Mojave panel,
in California had
and immutable

rights:"
All things must end, even in the field of water law. It is time
to recognize that this law is in flux and that its evolution has
passed beyond traditional concepts of vested and immutable
rights. In his review of our Supreme Court's recent water

rights decision in In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System (citation omitted),'-" Professor Freyfogle explains that California
is engaged in an evolving process of governmental redefinition of water rights. He concludes that "California has re-

gained for the public much of the power to prescribe water
use practices, to limit waste, and to sanction water transfers."

He asserts that the concept that "water use entitlements are
clearly and permanently defined," and are "neutral [and]

rule-driven," is a pretense to be discarded. It is a fundamental truth, he writes, that "everything is in the process of
changing or becoming" in water law.
In affirming this specific instance of far-reaching change, imposed upon traditional uses by what some claim to be evolutionary process, we but recognize this evolutionary process,
and urge reception and recognition of same upon those
whose work in the practical administration of water distribution makes such change understandably difficult to accept. 56

The Mojave panel took exception to the liD 2 court's suggestions
that California water law is in flux. According to the panel, "such
152. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
153. Id. at 261, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 563-64.
154. Id. at 267, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 573.
155. In reWater of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324, 338, 44 Cal. 3d 448, 472
(1988). In Hallett the court recognized an unexercised riparian right held by the federal government on its reserved lands, but held that the State Board had authority to
evaluate (and presumably to limit) any new proposed use of that water. Thus, the
court has even limited the nature of a vested right on federal reserved lands. Id. at
337-38, 44 Cal. 3d at 471-72; see also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697
F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1983) (declaring that when determining reasonable use as
that term is understood in Western water law, consideration should be made of the
alternative uses of water).
156. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr.
250, 267-68, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 (1990) (citing Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1546-47 (1989)).
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statements only create the uncertainty which our Supreme Court (sic)
has cautioned us against."'57 In drawing this conclusion, the Mojave
court relied on the fact that Article X, Section 2 has not changed substantively since 1928. However, the panel did not specifically address
the line of cases showing the judicial development of the law of reasonable use.
In another fairly recent case, United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board,"' (the "Racanelli" decision), an appellate court held that
the State Board could place restrictions on the state and federal water
projects without regard to their respective priorities. That case determined, inter alia, which parties would be responsible for curtailing
their water usage to provide mandated outflow from the SacramentoSan Joaquin Rivers/San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary. The Bureau of
Reclamation, operator of the federal Central Valley Project, alleged
that it had a higher priority than the State Water Project. Accordingly,
the Bureau argued that the State Board had no authority to compel
the federal project to contribute equal flows for Delta water quality.
The court disagreed, declaring that
[t] he scope and priority of appropriative rights are properly
defined by the Board acting within its power to consider the
relative benefits of competing interests and to impose such
conditions as are necessary to protect the public interest ....
[T]he Board... acted well within its authority and did not
infringe upon or otherwise unlawfully impair the 'vested' appropriative rights of the U.S. Bureau. '"
Although the California Supreme Court's most recent water law
opinion, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,' ° was not a reasonable use case, the court once again refused to apply strict priority principles. In that case, the court was faced with a conflict between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine. The Defendant, Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power ("DWP"), urged the court to
reject the application of the public trust doctrine to DWP's water diversion license. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs argued that the public
trust doctrine limits all appropriative water rights. The court rejected
both priority arguments:
We are unable to accept either position. In our opinion,
both the public trust doctrine and the water rights system
157. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 495, 64 Cal. App.
4th 737, 763 (1998).
158. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82 (1986).
159. Id. at 189-90, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 133; see also National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 729 n.30, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447 n.30 (1983) (inferring that unreasonable use may be any use less than the optimum allocation of water).
160. NationalAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
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embody important precepts which make the law more responsive to the diverse needs and interests involved in the
planning and allocation of water resources. To embrace one
system of thought and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one which would either decry as a breach
of trust appropriations essential to the economic develop-

ment of this state, or deny any duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by the public trust. Therefore, [we
must seek] an accommodation which will make use of the
pertinent principles of both the public trust doctrine and the
appropriative water rights system .... 16'
The case law recited above illustrates that reasonable use, the public trust doctrine and other concepts in California water law are not
static62 and that water rights may be reprioritized and significantly limited if the type or method of use in question is no longer reasonable.
In the context of the Mojave adjudication, the most noteworthy
case outlined above may be Forni. There, the court made clear that
senior users could be made to endure some inconvenience for the
good of other local interests and that courts should bear in mind the
161
needs of all California water users when resolving a water dispute.
Moreover, Long Valley indicates that land-based water rights may be reprioritized and limited if the circumstances so dictate. The Mojave
court's holding that immutable overlying rights can in no way be impacted by a physical solution is fundamentally inconsistent with these
cases.
B. Physical Solutions
A parallel development allowing and encouraging courts to utilize
"physical solutions" to resolve water disputes has come concurrently
with the development of the reasonable use doctrine. Courts have
shown their willingness to approve and encourage physical solutions
requiring parties to share the responsibility of water cutbacks. A physical solution resolves the parties' competing claims to water by satisfying, in a cooperative approach, the reasonable needs of each user.
Judicial recognition of physical solutions grew out of the distaste
for prohibitive injunctions, the more drastic remedy associated with
early water rights infringement cases 464 Courts appeared hesitant to
enjoin any reasonable and beneficial use of water when a less harsh solution might be available. The importance of physical solutions in resolving water disputes was elevated further with the implementation of
161. Id. at 727, 33 Cal. 3d at 445.
162. See ARTHUR L. LrLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 89 (1995)
(citing United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187-88,
182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130 (1986)).
163. See a/soJoslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 140 (1967).
164. See, e.g., Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 77 P. 1113, 1118,
144 Cal. 578, 592 (1904).
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the Article X, Section 2 requirement that the state's water resources be
utilized "to the fullest extent of which they are capable.' 65 "Since the
adoption of the 1928 constitutional amendment, it is not only within
the power but it is also the duty of the trial court to admit evidence relating to possible physical solutions, and if none is satisfactory to suggest on its own motion such physical solution."
Nevertheless, a
court's physical solution power was limited: physical solutions could
not be applied to eliminate vested rights and should "be adequate to
protect the one
having the paramount right in the substantial enjoy6 7
ment thereof.'

Still, the equitable nature of the judicial role in water rights disputes was squarely recognized. In Tulare, the court remanded the action to the trial court to determine the amount of, and to protect, the
water necessary to secure Plaintiffs' rights.'" In this context, the court
outlined the nature of the trial court's duty:
[T] he trial court should not lose sight of the fact that this is
an equity case. The equity courts possess broad powers and
should exercise them so as to do substantial justice. Heretofore, the equity courts, in water cases, apparently have not
seen fit to work out physical solutions of the problems presented, unless such solutions have been suggested by the parties. But it should be kept in mind that the equity court is
not bound or limited by the suggestions or offers made by
the parties to this, or any similar action. "9

Thereafter, the California Supreme Court regularly ordered lower
courts to ascertain whether physical solutions could be formulated, to
impose them where appropriate "regardless of whether the parties
agree," to utilize them to prevent unreasonable waste of water, to re-

tain continuing jurisdiction to revisit any unsatisfactory aspects of the
solution, and to protect prior appropriators without "unduly restraining" lower priority water rights holders.
165. City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 341
(1936).
166. Id.
167. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 499, 2 Cal 2d 383-84 (1935); see also
Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 562-63, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 557-59 (1938).
168. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 101315, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 579-83 (1935).
169. Id. at 1010, 3 Cal. 2d at 574.
170. City of Lodi, 60 P.2d at 450-53, 7 Cal. 3d at 341-45; see also Reclamation Dist. No.
833 v. Quigley, 64 P.2d 399, 402, 8 Cal. 2d 183, 188 (1937) (stating the trial court
should have attempted to ascertain the most reasonable physical solution); Meridian
Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 571-72, 13 Cal 2d 424, 491-93
(1939) (physical solution allowed); Montecito Valley, 77 P.2d at 1122, 144 Cal. at 578
(directing the court to fashion a physical solution); Peabody, 40 P.2d at 497-99, 2 Cal.
2d at 380; Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 P.2d 681, 688-89, 10 Cal. 2d
677, 687 (1938) (ordering trial court to develop physical solution for benefit of
school); Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co., 176 P.2d 8, 22-23, 29 Cal. 2d 446, 488-90
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In Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, the court reaffirmed the trial
court's responsibility to fashion a physical solution even if the parties
did not suggest it: (1) to ensure that water is not wasted; and (2) to
preclude the imposition of an injunctive remedy that might ultimately
be injurious to one or both parties."' In Vail, the court even set out
specific suggestions for the trial court to use on remand to allocate
the
72
waters of the Santa Margarita River between the two litigants.
In Forni, the case involving grape growers' rights to water from the
Napa River, the appellate court called for a physical solution. On remand, both riparians and appropriators were required to build water
storage facilities to give them access to water during periods of peak
demand. 73 Physical solutions have also been employed to resolve several large, multi-party groundwater and surface water rights cases in
Southern California.
Each of these actions terminated at the trial
court level.
The importance of the law of physical solutions as it applies to the
Mojave case is several-fold. The law states that courts have equitable
power and a duty to consider utilizing physical solutions where it is
feasible to do so. The Mojave panel's opinion would have limited this
authority by virtually eliminating the trial court's power to curtail water
users with "paramount" rights. This holding is also in conflict with
previous California Supreme Court decisions involving the use of
physical solutions to reach an equitable apportionment of water rights.
C. Equitable Apportionment
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is a water allocation
method customary to Western water law that originally derives from
federal common law.7 5 Equitable apportionment has been considered
by several California courts reviewing groundwater disputes."" Al(1946).
171. Rancho Santa Margarita,81 P.2d at 562, 11 Cal. 2d at 559-60. "[Ilt has been held
that it is not only within the power, but it is the duty of the trial court, to work out, if
possible a physical solution .... " Id.
172. Id. at 563, 11 Cal. 2d at 560.
173. People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851,
855-58, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 750-54 (1976); see also California Trout, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 801-02 n.6, 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 208-10 n.6 (1990) (noting
that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power could be compelled as a price of
continued appropriation from streams feeding Mono Lake to take reasonable steps to
restore the creeks and fisheries to their natural state, so long as there was no associated waste of water).
174. See, e.g., Orange County Water Dist. v. City of Chino, Orange County Superior
Court Case No. 117628 (1969) (ground and surface water rights to Santa Ana water
system); Chino Basin Mun. Water Dist. v. City of Chino, San Bernardino Superior
Court Case No. 1644327 (1978) (general adjudication of Chino Basin, a large
groundwater basin); Western Mun. Water Dist. v. East San Bernardino County Water
Dist., Riverside County Superior Court Case No. 78426 (physical solution involving
certain parties in upper watershed of Santa Ana water system).
175. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 617-19; Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 555 (1963).
176. E.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 924-
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though not recognized by the term "equitable apportionment," the
doctrine was first applied by the California Supreme Court in City of
Pasadena. There, the court determined that rigid application of water
rights priorities in the basin would result in:
An unequal sharing of the burden of curtailing the overdraft .... Such a result does not appear to be justified where
all the parties have been producing water from the underground basin for many years, and none of them have acted to
protect the supply or prevent invasion of their rights until
this proceeding was instituted. Moreover, it seems probable
that the solution adopted by the trial court will promote the
best interest of the public, because a pro tanto reduction of
the amount of water devoted to each present use would normally be less disruptive than total elimination of some of the
uses. 177
This affirmance of the trial court's pro tanto reduction of each user's
water right was an attempt by the court to reach an equitable apportionment. An absolute application of the priority rule in City of Pasadena would have compelled later appropriators to bear the full brunt
of groundwater restrictions, while78 earlier appropriators would have
been free to resume full pumping.

In San Fernando, the California Supreme Court reexamined and
reworked the concept of mutual prescription to reach an equitable
apportionment. The court recognized the superior status of Los Angeles' Pueblo rights'79 and precluded the application of prescription as
against public entities, 8 ° but also determined that overlying owners
could retain their priority and rights through the doctrine of selfhelp. 181
San Fernando is an extremely important case to the extent it suggests the court's support of flexible application of the priority rule.
The court again acknowledged that application of rigid allocation
schemes may not produce fair results and will not necessarily lead to
the most equitable apportionment of water.82 Most illustrative of this
movement towards equitable apportionment is footnote 61 of the decision. Quoting the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nebraska
v. Wyoming, the California Supreme Court wrote:

26, 933-35 (1949); Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 924-26, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000-03 (1975).
177. Pasadena,207 P.2d at 32, 33 Cal. 2d at 932-33.
178. Id.
179. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1288-90, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 252-54 (1975).
180. Id. at 1304-05, 14 Cal. 3d at 274.
181. Id.atl3l9n.101, 14 Cal. 3d at293 n.101.
182. Id. at 1291-98, 14 Cal. 3d at 256-265.
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[I]f an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not
be possible. For example, the economy of a region may have
been established on the basis ofjunior appropriations. So far
as possible those established uses should be protected though
strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them.
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climactic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the
extent of established uses, the availability of storage water,
the practical affect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the formerthese are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative
not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the
problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.'
Other factors to be considered when a court applies an equitable
apportionment are set out in Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District
v. Armstrong.
By analogy to riparian rights, where there is insufficient water
for the current reasonable needs of all the overlying owners,
many factors are to be considered in determining each
owner's proportionate share: the amount of water available,
the extent of ownership in the basin, the nature of the projected use-if for agriculture, the area sought to be irrigated,
the character of the soil, the practicability of irrigation, i.e.
the expense thereof, the comparative profit of the different
crops which could be made of the water on the land-all
these and many other 8considerations
must enter into the so4
lution of the problem.

In their brief to the appellate court, the stipulating parties compared the Mojave Basin adjudication to the factual situation in City of
Pasadena. Specifically, the stipulating parties contended that, like in
City of Pasadena, the Mojave Basin overdraft had commenced long before the filing of the litigation in the matter.18 5 In addition, the Cardozo Appellants had not commenced their pumping in the Mojave Ba-

183. Id. at 1298 n.61, 14 Cal. 3d at 265 n.61.
184. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918,
925, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001-02 (1975).
185. Respondents' Brief at 22, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).
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sin until after the overdraft had begun. 8 6 Also, the stipulating parties
alleged that many of the other factors set out in footnote 61 of the San
Fernando opinion indicated that an equitable allocation of the basin
waters would be the most fair and just result.'
Above all, the court
was asked to recognize that the multi-billion-dollar economy of the basin had developed
during the more than four decades since the over88
draft began.

The appeals court opinion in Mojave declined plaintiffs' invitation
to reach an equitable apportionment in the Mojave basin."' However,
the numerous cases supporting physical solutions and apparently signaling a judicial recognition of equitable apportionment were not satisfactorily distinguished by the Mojave appeals court decision. In addition, the Mojave panel's substantial reliance on Wright v. Goleta Water
District'9° to justify its refusal to reach an equitable apportionment
seems misplaced. There, overlying landowners filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to determine the relative rights to a
groundwater basin in Santa Barbara County.'
The trial court in
Wright held that the unexercised rights of overlying landowners had a
lower priority than the rights of appropriators who exercised their water rights. 9 2 The trial court drew this conclusion by analogizing the
case to the stream adjudication involving riparian rights in In re Waters
of Long Valley Creek Stream System' As indicated earlier, in that case the
California Supreme Court held that the State Board had the authority
to define and limit unexercised riparian rights in considering those
rights in relation to all other water rights of a stream system pursuant
94
to the statutory adjudication procedure set out in the Water Code.'
However, the appellate court in Wright rejected the trial court's
analogy to riparian rights law. The court of appeal's opinion acknowledged that the trial court's conclusion promoted certainty in Califor186. Id.
187. Respondents' Brief at 23, Mojave (No. E017881).

The stipulating parties

pointed out that: (1) all of the parties to the litigation had actual or constructive
knowledge of their contribution to the overdraft; (2) the physical solution would not

unduly impact agricultural interests and could in fact provide benefits to those indi-

viduals and corporations by allowing for transfer of water rights in certain circumstances; (3) the physical solution protected groundwater flow and historical stream

amounts; (4) underground storage capacity in the basin was maximized; (5) junior
water users might be unfairly impacted if water rights priorities were strictly enforced;
(6) most water rights in the basin were subject to heavy dispute; and (7) no party

could show, including the dairy farming Cardozo Appellants, that they would be significantly or economically impacted by any of the assessments proposed to be part of

the physical solution. Respondents' Brief at 23-24, Mojave (No. E017881).
188. Respondents' Brief at 23, Mojave (No. E017881).
189. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 754-55.
190. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).

191. Id. at 743, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 78.
192. Id.
193. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 25 Cal. 3d 339
(1979).
194. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 746, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 83 (citing Long Valley, 599 P.2d
at 668-69, 25 Cal. 3d at 356-59).
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nia water rights law by setting forth firm water rights for the parties to
the adjudication.195 Indeed, the appellate court stated that, in philosophical terms, it agreed with the trial court's position.1 96 The opinion,
nevertheless, concluded that stare decisis and due process considerations compelled the judicial recognition of the validity of unexercised
overlying rights because, unlike the restrictions placed on riparian
rights in cases such as Long Valley, People v. Shirokow,'9 7(prescriptive
rights), and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 98 (public trust
doctrine), groundwater is exempt from the pervasive regulations affecting surface water'

9

[A]bsent a statutory scheme for comprehensive determination of all groundwater rights, the application of Long Valley
to a private adjudication would allow prospective rights of
overlying landowners to be subject to the vagaries of an individual plaintiffs pleading without adequate due process protections (italics added). Therefore, we must reverse the
judgment and remand the matter for a re-determination in
accord with the principles enunciated in Tulare District v.
Lindsay-StrathmoreDistrict... (italics added). 200
It should be recognized that the Wright court's refusal to limit overlying rights focused on due process considerations not applicable to
the Mojave decision. The Mojave Basin physical solution was developed over a lengthy period and all major pumpers participated in that
outcome. No claim was made by the Cardozo Appellants that they
were not given notice of the negotiations, not allowed to participate in
the negotiations or at trial, or that their due process rights were violated. The Mojave panel also ignored the fact that the Wright court re-

manded the matter to the trial court to follow the principles outlined
in Tulare, a case which is noteworthy for the Supreme Court's lengthy
discussion of the trial court's duty to use its equitable powers to encourage or fashion a physical solution. Finally, contrary to the Wright
holding, stare decisis does not call for unwavering commitment to overlying rights. Thus, the Mojave panel abided by the strict letter of the
Wright holding, while ignoring the reasoning of that case.

195. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 86.
196. Id.
197. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 26 Cal. 3d 301 (1980).

198. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 33 Cal. 3d 419
(1983).
199. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 89.
200. Id. at 750, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 89. In Wright and in Tulare IrrigationDistrict v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, 45 P.2d 972, 3 Cal. 2d 489 (1935), the California
Supreme Court explained the effects and relationship between Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution and the long-standing riparian rights doctrine. Tulare, 45
P.2d at 985-87, 3 Cal. 2d at 524-26.
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IV. ISSUES FACING THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
The California Supreme Court may be ready to explicitly recognize
the goal of equitable apportionment in California groundwater law.
This acceptance could take one of many forms. For example, footnote
61 from the San Fernando decision may indicate the direction the high
court's opinion will take. Consistent with footnote 61, even if equitable apportionment were more formally recognized by the court, water
rights priorities would still remain a primary focus ofjudicial action in
groundwater rights disputes.
Another issue facing the California Supreme Court is what is
meant by certainty in water rights. In light of the Mojave court's finding that "certainty" is promoted by judicial recognition of the absolute
sanctity of overlying water rights, the meaning and proper application
of that term may need to be reevaluated and clarified by the California
Supreme Court. This is especially true in light of the California Supreme Court's language in Peabody v. City of Vallejo which seems
to
20
equate certainty with the "substantial enjoyment" of a prior right. 1
Assuring certainty of water rights has always been a challenge facing California water law. The California Supreme Court's line of decisions limiting the application of strict priorities and encouraging
physical solutions hinges upon the practical policy that uncertainty is
the bane of California water rights and that "vested" water rights are a
principal source of that uncertainty. 20 2 Among other problems, uncertainty
inhibits long range planning and investment for the development and use of waters .... [D]ormant riparian rights
"constitute the main threat to nonriparian and out-ofwatershed development, they are the principal cause of insecurity of existing riparian uses .... They are unrecorded,
their quantity is unknown, their administration in the courts
provides very little opportunity for control in the public interest. To the extent that they may deter others from using
the water for fear of their ultimate exercise, they are wasteful,
in the sense of costing the economy the benefits lost from deterred uses."2°
A long line of cases, beginning with Gin Chow, illustrates the intertwined concepts of reasonableness and certainty. The relationship between reasonableness and certainty is undeniable. 4 As explained in
201. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 499, 2 Cal. 2d 357, 383-84 (1935).
202. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 666, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 354-55 (1979); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275
Cal. Rptr. 250, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (1990).
203. Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 666, 25 Cal. 3 at 355.
204. As the concept of reasonableness has evolved, so it appears, has the concept of
certainty. Once certainty seemed to focus on assuring that individual local producers

Issue I

MOJA VE RIVER ADJUDICATION

the stipulating parties' petition for review of the Mojave decision to the
California Supreme Court:
This Court has held that the constitutional requirement of
creating the maximum beneficial use of state waters man-

dates the quantitative determination of rights in a comprehensive adjudication of all rights to use a water source (citation omitted). Quantification is necessary to create certainty
as to amounts which may be produced. Such certainty generates water producers' investment in facilities which in turn
causes water to be put to maximum reasonable and beneficial

use (citation omitted).205

In the modern context, limiting unexercised riparian or overlying
rights and quantifying water rights as part of a stream or basin adjudication creates certainty. Economic investment, whether urban or agricultural, relies on a secure water supply and on the orderly movement
of water and water rights. The Mojave panel seems to have turned the
concept of certainty on its head by determining that certainty is manifested by recognizing the immutable unquantified and unregulated
water rights of an overlying owner, while simultaneously concluding
that: "[u] ncertainty is promoted by a [trial court] judgment which disregards all existing and future riparian, overlying and prescriptive
rights, and allocates water on the basis of the amount of actual production (regardless of whether there
'' 6 was a right to produce) in one of the
five years prior to filing of suit. 1
To bolster its holding that overlying water rights cannot be disregarded in the Mojave Basin without the concurrence of the Cardozo
Appellants, the panel relied on Wright v. Goleta Water District. However,

Wright expressly recognizes that certainty is promoted by declaring
firm, quantified water rights for each party to a groundwater adjudication, not
by leaving overlying owners with unregulated, unquantified
20 7
rights.
Long Valley, in a riparian setting, recognized the pernicious
effects of uncertainty concerning the rights of water users,
including the inhibition it causes on long-range planning

had sufficient available water to meet their needs. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 996, 3 Cal. 2d 489, 545 (1935). Now, certainty seems to be examined from a broader statewide perspective. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 225 Cal. App. 3d
548, 570-71 (1990); Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 666, 25 Cal. 3d at 355.
205. Respondents' Brief at 14, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d 477, 64 Cal. App. 4th 737 (1998) (No. E017881).
206. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 760-61.
207. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748, 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 86
(1985). Indeed, as early as 1935, the California Supreme Court recognized that uncertainty is created where water rights holders are unable to appropriate a fixed quantity
of water. Tulare,45 P.2d at 996, 3 Cal. 2d at 545.
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and investment for development and use of water, and the
fostering of costly and piecemeal litigation (citation omitted)
(italics added). Those same factors should apply with equal
vigor to groundwater rights since the Legislature "has totally
failed to enact a program that would fulfill the State's own
policy declarations (citation omitted) (emphasis added)."
Like the unexercised riparian right, the unexercised
groundwater right of an overlying landowner is unrecorded,
of unknown quantity, with little opportunity for control in
the public interest, and wasteful to the extent it deters others
from using water for fear of its ultimate exercise (citations
omitted).
Even though it may appear a logical extension of Long Valley
to allow a trial court adjudicating competing claims to
groundwater to subordinate an unexercised right to a present appropriative use, we must hold such extension inappropriate (italics added). Philosophically, we agree with District's position but stare decisis and due process
considerations, not a concern under the current riparian
statutory scheme, compel us to reach the opposite conclusion
in this case. 20R1
Based upon this reasoning, the Mojave court's position on the certainty issue and its reliance on Wright is untenable. Under the appellate court decision, the Cardozo Appellants' water rights remain unquantified and limited only by the doctrines of reasonable and
beneficial use. The stipulating parties cannot be certain as to the
amount of water that will be used by Cardozo Appellants and thus how
much water will be available for other basin water users. The Cardozo
Appellants themselves do not know the amount of their rights. 0 9
Moreover, by leaving Cardozo Appellants' rights undefined and
keeping the farmers out of the physical solution, they need not participate in the mechanisms embodied in the solution to guarantee the
health of the groundwater basin. Nevertheless, the Cardozo Appellants will enjoy the benefits of the physical solution in the form of increased recharge to the Mojave Basin. Thus, they reap at least some of
the rewards attendant to the improved water supply to the basin without contributing to the stipulating parties' effort. This result ignores
the practical realities of resolving overdraft problems in groundwater
basins, and causes the type of "inconclusive fragmentary definition of
water rights" and uncertainty the California Supreme Court has sought

208. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 87.
209. In a similar vein, the Cardozo Appellants' water rights may be less certain under
the Mojave opinion than they would be under the physical solution. Their overlying
use of water to grow alfalfa could still be deemed unreasonable in the future. See generallyJoslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 67 Cal. 2d 140 (1967).
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to discourage.2 0
The California Supreme Court may also opine on other water law
issues presented in Mojave. The existing decisions raise uncertainty
about who curtails water use in an overdrafted basin. The San
Fernando case clearly holds that municipal appropriators cannot be
prescripted against because of Civil Code section 1007.211 However, the
holding in Blue Skies implies that an overlying user cannot lose its right
to water it has pumped. This conflict leaves unresolved which user
curtails its water use when there is not enough water available in the
basin. Is it the appropriator who cannot be prescripted against, or is it
the overlyer who cannot lose its right to water that it has pumped?
The court may explain how the statutory policy declaring domestic
212
use of water to be the highest use of water impacts the Mojave Basin.
Finally, the court may also settle arguments raised at the trial court
level that the Cardozo Appellants should be precluded by the doctrines of laches and estoppel from contesting pumping by the municipal purveyors. Municipal pumping, and the basin's severe overdraft,
have been known to the general public for more than four decades.
Thus, the stipulating parties have argued that the Cardozo Appellants
lost their fight of protest by not contesting the municipal water production sooner.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mojave case illustrates that the rigid application of water rights
in a groundwater adjudication is incongruent with California water
law. In this era of increasing demand and limited supply, traditional
water rights priorities can no longer be the sole component of a
court's analysis. Inflexibility is not a practical method for determining
water rights in a modern society, especially one with a growing emphasis on municipal and industrial water allocation. As illustrated by the
result reached by the Mojave panel, inequitable results flow from rigid
application of water rights priorities. The California Supreme Court
now has the opportunity to revisit and advance groundwater law and to
help fashion a contemporary solution to overdraft problems.

210. See In reWaters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 666, 25 Cal. 3d
339, 355-56 (1979).
211. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1305, 14 Cal. 3d

199, 275 (1975).
212. Cal. Water Code §106 (West 1997).

